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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050976-CA
v.
ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM GUILTY PLEAS TO COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1999),
AND FORGERY, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6-405 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING
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February 9, 2007
Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0230
Re:

-7fc>
State v. Tenorio, Case No. 20050967<CA
Oral argument set: February 15, 2007

Dear Ms. Collins,
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
After the State filed its brief on July 31, 2006, this Court issued the following decisions,
State v. Briggs, 2006 UT App 448, ^ 6, 147 P.3d 969; State v. Canchola-Rodriguez, 2006
UT App 481U; State v. Johns, 2006 UT App 499U; and State v. Serrano, 2007 UT App
28U—all of which are relevant to the State's argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider defendant's claims. See Aple. Br. at 8-27.
A copy of each of these decisions is attached for the Court's convenience.
Respectfully submitted,

&• Plue^uk
Karen A. Klucznik /
Assistant Attorney General
encl.
cc:

Joan C. Watt, Attorney for Appellant (w/ encl.)
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147P.3d969
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT App 448
(Cite as: 147P.3d969)

C
State v. BriggsUtah App.,2006.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Brandon James BRIGGS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20050734-CA.

Objection
&#xa0; 110kl043(2) k. Necessity of
Specific Objection. Most Cited Cases
Defendant failed to preserve for review on direct
appeal claim that trial court should have inquired
into counsel's reference to State's violation of plea
agreement, where defendant did not state legal basis
for objection or request specific relief.

Nov. 2, 2006.
[2] Criminal Law 110 €^>1028
Background: Defendant was convicted on guilty
plea in the Second District Court Farmington
Department, Darwin C. Hansen, J., of drug charge.
Defendant appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood,
Associate P.J., held that Court of Appeals lacked
jurisdiction to consider post-sentence claim of
ineffective assistance of plea counsel.

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl028 k. Presentation of Questions
in General. Most Cited Cases
Claims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal.
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^1043(2)

Affirmed in part; appeal dismissed in part.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 €^>1031(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110k 1031 In Preliminary Proceedings
110k 1031(4) k. Arraignment and
Plea. Most Cited Cases
Criminal Law 110 €^1043(2)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110k 1043 Scope and Effect of
© 2007 Thomson/West. No

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl043 Scope and Effect
of
Objection
110kl043(2) k. Necessity of
Specific Objection. Most Cited Cases
In order to preserve an objection for appellate
review, specific objections are required in order to
bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention
and to give the court an opportunity to correct the
errors if appropriate.
[4] Criminal Law 110 €^1031(4)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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147P.3d969
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT App 448
(Cite as: 147 P.3d 969)
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl031 In Preliminary Proceedings
11 Ok 1031(4) k. Arraignment and
Plea. Most Cited Cases
Defendant was not entitled to appellate review of
claim that trial court should have inquired into
counsel's reference to state's breach of plea
agreement at sentencing for drug charge, where
defendant did not argue plain error or exceptional
circumstances on appeal.
[5] Criminal Law 110 €^1030(1)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl030 Necessity of Objections in
General
110kl030(l) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
If a defendant fails to make a proper objection to
the trial court, a reviewing court may consider an
issue on appeal if the defendant establishes that
plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances
exist.
[6] Criminal Law 110 €=>1044.1(2)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110k 1044 Motion Presenting Objection
110kl044.1 In General; Necessity
of Motion
110kl044.1(2) k. Preliminary
Proceedings;
Indictment,
Information,
or
Complaint. Most Cited Cases
Defendant's failure to file motion to withdraw guilty
plea to drug charge prior to sentencing precluded
review on direct appeal of claim of ineffective
assistance of plea counsel; rather, defendant's
remedy was to file motion for postconviction relief.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; West's U.C.A. §
77-13-6(2); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65C.

*969 Scott L. Wiggins, Arnold & Wiggins, PC, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Brett J.
DelPorto, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges
THORNE.

GREENWOOD,

ORME,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
If 1 Defendant Brandon James Briggs appeals his
conviction on a drug charge after pleading guilty.
First, Defendant argues that he is entitled to
withdraw his guilty plea because the sentencing
court failed to inquire into his comment that the
State may have breached the plea agreement.
Second, Defendant asserts that this court should
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to withdraw the plea. We do not address
the merits of either of Defendant's claims.
Defendant failed to preserve the first claim in the
trial court, and he does not argue plain error or
exceptional circumstances on appeal. See State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1 H, 10 P.3d 346.
Furthermore, this court lacks jurisdiction to
consider Defendant's second claim. See State v.
Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1 3, 40 P.3d 630.
1 2 Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
Defendant pleaded guilty as charged. *970 The
agreement provided: "Defendant to plead as
charged, State will stipulate to a double 402 per
statute if defendant is granted and completes
probation without any violations; otherwise silent
on sentencing." After accepting the plea, the trial
court set a date for sentencing and ordered Adult
Probation and Parole (AP & P) to complete a
presentence investigation report.
1 3 At sentencing, AP & P recommended prison.
Defendant's trial counsel argued that instead of
prison, Defendant should be given probation so that
he could have the opportunity to be screened for
and accepted by the Job Corps Program (Job
Corps). The State responded by arguing
extensively that Job Corps was inappropriate.
Defendant's trial counsel then stated: "I guess for

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

147 P.3d 969
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT App 448
(Cite as: 147 P.3d 969)
the record I would object to the State's comments.
I think under the circumstances where there [are]
two alternatives on the table, I think speaking
against [J]ob [C]orp[s] and the other comment is
essentially a back-door recommendation for prison,
[in] violation of the plea agreement." The court
then made some additional comments, and
sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
[1][2][3] | 4 Defendant argues that the trial court
should have conducted a detailed inquiry into his
objection that the prosecutor may have breached the
plea agreement. We believe this argument was not
adequately preserved for appeal. "As a general
rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not
be raised on appeal." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at \
11, 10 P.3d 346. "Utah courts require specific
objections in order 'to bring all claimed errors to
the trial court's attention to give the court an
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.' "
State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244,^ 14, 54 P.3d
645 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361
(Utah Ct.App.1993)). Although Defendant brought
the alleged violation of the plea agreement to the
court's attention, by failing to state a legal basis for
his objection or request any specific relief,
Defendant did not "give the court an opportunity to
correct the error[ ]." Id.; see also Brown, 856 P.2d
at 361 ("An oblique reference to an issue in the
absence of an 'objection to the trial court's failure
to rule on the issue' does not put that issue properly
before the court." (quoting LeBaron & Assocs. v.
Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah
Ct.App.1991))). At the very least, for purposes of
preservation, Defendant needed to specify the
alleged error and provide a legal justification to
support his argument so that the trial court could "
assess [the] allegations ... and consider[ ] them in
the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at
issue." Hardy, 2002 UT App 244 at f 15, 54 P.3d
645 (quotations and citation omitted). Because
Defendant failed to articulate a proper objection,
this issue has not been preserved.
[4] [5] f 5 Moreover, Defendant does not argue
plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal.
If a defendant fails to make a proper objection to
the trial court, a reviewing court may consider an
© 2007 Thomson/West. No CI

issue on appeal if the defendant establishes that
plain error occurred or exceptional circumstances
exist. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49,K
18, 122 P.3d 566 (imposing burden of establishing
plain error or exceptional circumstances on
appellant). In this instance, Defendant fails to
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on
appeal. Therefore, this court will not address the
merits of his claim that the trial court should have
inquired into his objection.
[6] K 6 Further, because Defendant failed to timely
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this court
lacks jurisdiction to consider his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Utah Code section
77-13-6(2) states that a defendant is required to file
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea "before
sentence is announced.... Any challenge to a guilty
plea not made [before sentence is announced] shall
be pursued under ... [the] Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C[ of the] Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b),
(c) (Supp.2006); see also id. §§ 78-35a-101 to -304
(2002 & Supp.2006); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Under
section 77-13-6(2), if a motion to withdraw a plea is
not timely filed, this court does not have jurisdiction
to review the plea, even on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(b); see also State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,
If 3, 40 P.3d 630; *971 State v. Melo, 2001 UT
App 392,KU 4, 8-9, 40 P.3d 646. Because
Defendant did not file a timely motion to withdraw
his plea, this court lacks jurisdiction to review it on
direct appeal. Therefore,
Defendant's
only
remaining option is to raise this claim under the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule 65C of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 77-13-6(2), 78-35a-101 to -304; Utah R.
Civ. P. 65C.
K 7 In sum, we do not address Defendant's claim
that the trial court should have conducted a more
detailed inquiry into his objection because
Defendant failed to adequately preserve the issue in
the trial court, and he does not argue plain error or
exceptional circumstances on appeal. Moreover,
this court does not have jurisdiction to consider
Defendant's claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw
toOrig. U.S. Govt. Works.

147P.3d969
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147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,2006 UT App 448
(Cite as: 147 P.3d 969)
the plea.
1 8 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME,
Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judge.
Utah App.,2006.
State v. Briggs
147 P.3d 969, 564 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2006 UT
App 448
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3518254 (Utah App.),
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)

State v. Canchola-RodriguezUtah App.,2006.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ricardo CANCHOLA-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20060896-CA.
Dec. 7, 2006.

Second
District,
Farmington
Department,
051701664; The Honorable Darwin C. Hansen.
Joseph Jardine, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication).
PER CURIAM:
*1 Ricardo Canchola-Rodriguez appeals from his
convictions on three felony charges after pleading
guilty. This is before the court on its own motion
for summary disposition based on lack of a
substantial
question
for
review
and
on
Canchola-Rodriguez's motion for remand pursuant
to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B.

UT App 481

filed prior to sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). The failure to timely file a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes a
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the
guilty plea on appeal." State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,
\ 3, 40 P.3d 630; see also State v. Merrill, 2005
UT 34, 114 P.3d 585 (holding the time limit in
section 77-13-6 is jurisdictional). Absent a timely
motion to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack
jurisdiction to consider any issue attacking the
guilty plea itself, including whether a defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel in
entering the plea agreement. See State v. Briggs,
2006
UT
App
448,H
6.
Because
Canchola-Rodriguez failed to timely move to
withdraw his guilty pleas, this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider his claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with
his pleas. He has not raised any other issue that this
court may review.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on the dismissal,
Canchola-Rodriguez's motion for remand is denied
as moot.
Utah App.,2006.
State v. Canchola-Rodriguez
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3518254 (Utah
App.), 2006 UT App 481
END OF DOCUMENT

Although Canchola-Rodriguez pleaded guilty and
seeks to attack those pleas on appeal, albeit on a
theory of ineffective assistance of counsel, he did
not file a motion to withdraw his pleas in the district
court. His failure to timely file a motion to
withdraw his pleas bars this court from considering
his challenge to the validity of his pleas on appeal.
Pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6, a request to
withdraw a guilty plea must be made by a motion
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3647895 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 499
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)

State v. JohnsUtah App.,2006.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Randall K. JOHNS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20050746-CA.
Dec. 14,2006.

Second District, Ogden Department, 041903027;
The Honorable Michael D. Lyon.
Randall W. Richards, Ogden, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and ORME

raise this claim under the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." Id. Accord Utah Code Ann. §
77-13-6(2)(c)(Supp.2006).
Defendant additionally argues that it was plain error
for the trial court to fail to rule, sua sponte, that
Defendant was incompetent at the time he entered
his plea. This argument is misplaced because the
issue here is one of jurisdiction and not of
preservation. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 4,
40 P.3d 630. "This court may choose to review an
issue not properly preserved for plain error. It
cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue
over which it has no jurisdiction." Id. (citation
omitted).
Accordingly, we dismiss Defendant's appeal. Given
our lack of jurisdiction over this appeal, any
correction of the sentencing error alleged by the
State will need to be effected through other means.

WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge:
*1 We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented in the briefs
and record[,] and the decisional process would not
be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah
R.App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, the issues presented
are readily resolved under applicable law.

Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS,
Judge.
Utah App.,2006.
State v. Johns
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 3647895 (Utah
App.), 2006 UT App 499
END OF DOCUMENT

Defendant argues he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because his trial counsel did not move to
disallow Defendant's plea based on Defendant's
incompetence. But "if a motion to withdraw a plea
is not timely filed, this court does not have
jurisdiction to review the plea, even on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Briggs,
2006 UT App 448,1f 6. Because no motion to
withdraw the plea was filed in the instant case, we
do not have jurisdiction over this appeal. "
Therefore, Defendant's only remaining option is to
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Not Reported in P 3d, 2007 WL 274760 (Utah App), 2007 UT App 28
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)

State v SerranoUtah App ,2007
UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING
Court of Appeals of Utah
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
John Pres SERRANO, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20060132-CA.
Feb 1,2007

Seventh
District,
Castle
Dale
Department,
051700111, The Honorable Bruce K Halliday
Samuel S Bailey, Price, for Appellant
Mark L Shurtleff and Kris C Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
Before Judges BENCH, McHUGH, and THORNE
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM
*1 This matter is before the court on John Pres
Serrano's rule 23 B motion to remand the case for
additional findmgs and the State's motion for
summary disposition
Serrano entered into a plea agreement with the
State As a result, on November 1, 2005, he pleaded
guilty to one count of aggravated assault and one
count of driving under the influence Serrano never
filed a motion to withdraw his plea prior to
sentencing On November 8, 2006, the district court
sentenced Serrano to an indeterminate term of
zero-to-five years in prison The judgment,
sentence, and commitment were entered on
February 13,2006
In order to challenge the validity of a guilty plea, a
defendant must first file a motion to withdraw his
plea before the sentence is announced See Utah

Code Ann § 77-13-6 (Supp 2006), see also State v
Merrill 2005 UT 34/||f 13-20, 114 P 3d 585
Absent a timely filed motion to withdraw a guilty
plea, this court does not have jurisdiction on a
direct appeal to review the validity of the plea See
Merrill 2005 UT 34 at 1fl[ 13-20, see also Utah
Code Ann § 77-13-6(2)(c) ("Any challenge to a
guilty plea not made within the time period
specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued
under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure ") This includes the ability to challenge
the plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel See Merrill 2005 UT 34 at 1fl[ 17-19,
see also State v Briggs 2006 UT App 448,1 6,
149 P3d 969, State v Melo 2001 UT App 392,1
9, 40 P 3d 646
Serrano has cited two issues on appeal Serrano first
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because
counsel implied that if Serrano pleaded guilty, he
would spend no more than six months in the local
jail Second, Serrano argues that the district court
failed to effectively inform Serrano of his right to
withdraw his plea as required by rule 11(e)(7) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Because both
issues relate to the validity of the plea, this court
does not have jurisdiction to review the issues See
Merrill 2005 UT 34 at If 20 If Serrano seeks to
challenge the validity of his plea he must do so
pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(c) FN1
FN1 Because this court does not have
jurisdiction to review the validity of
Serrano's claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective, Serrano's rule 23B motion to
remand the case to the district court for
additional findings of fact is necessarily
denied
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal
Utah App ,2007

© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 274760 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 28
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)
State v. Serrano
Not Reported in P.3d, 2007 WL 274760 (Utah
App.), 2007 UT App 28
END OF DOCUMENT

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
RAYMOND A. H.NTZE
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Chief Deputy

®

K.RK TORGENSEN
Chief Deputy

January 25, 2007
Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0230
Re:

State v. Tenorio, Case No. 20e5096^CA
Oral argument set: February 15, 2007

Dear Ms. Collins,
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
After the State filed its brief on July 31, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v.
Norris, 2007 UT 5,
P.3d , and Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11. Also after the
State filed its brief, this Court decided State v. Hudson, 2007 UT App 23U.
Grimmett and Hudson are relevant to the State's argument that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims. See Aple. Br. at 8-27. Norris is relevant to
the State's argument that defendant waived any right to appeal his convictions or to
challenge the jurisdictional nature of the plea withdrawal statute when he entered his
guilty plea. See Aple. Br. at 17-27.
A copy of each of these decisions is attached for the Court's convenience.
Respectfully submitted,

Karen A. Klucznik ^
Assistant Attorney General
end.
cc:

Joan C. Watt, Attorney for Appellant (w/ encl.)

2 0 0 7 UT 5

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Petitioner,

No. 20040880

v.
F I L E D
Richard F. Norris,
Defendant, Petitioner,
and Cross-Respondent.

January 19, 2007

Fourth District, Provo Dep't
The Honorable James R. Taylor
No. 981403794
Attorneys:

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., E. Neal Gunnarson,
Jeffrey S. Gray, Christine F. Soltis, Asst,
Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Jennifer K. Gowans, Provo, Salt Lake City, for
defendant

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice:
^1
The defendant, Richard Norris, challenges the
constitutionality of the Communications Fraud statute, Utah Code
section 76-10-1801, as overbroad. Specifically, he seeks review
of the decision of the court of appeals holding that the statute
is constitutional.
%2
The State cross-petitions, seeking reversal of the
decision of the court of appeals that an unconditional guilty
plea does not waive a defendant's appellate challenge to the
facial constitutionality of the statute under which the defendant
was charged.1

1

State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732.

t3
Because we reverse, holding that an unconditional
guilty plea does waive a defendant's right to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute, we do not reach the other issues
presented.
f4
Review of the specific facts leading to the charges
against the defendant are not necessary for the resolution of
this matter. The defendant was originally charged with seven
counts of communications fraud. The State amended the
information, and the defendant was ultimately tried on five
counts of communications fraud.
%5
After three days of trial, the defendant elected to
change his plea and entered an unconditional guilty plea to three
counts of communications fraud. All are third degree felonies.
f6
The defendant made no attempt to withdraw his
unconditional guilty plea. He did, however, timely file an
appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the convictions. We
granted certiorari to review the correctness of that action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
%7
On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals and not the decision of the trial court.2 "The
determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction
is a question of law, which we review for correctness."3
ANALYSIS
f8
In order to reach the issues of overbreadth and
vagueness, the court of appeals initially addressed the question
of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the
conviction on appeal once the defendant had entered an
unconditional guilty plea. The court of appeals4 found that a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
jurisdictional in nature and that, therefore, an unconditional
2

State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).

3

Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, ^ 8, 31 P.3d

1147.
4

Each of the court of appeals judges who sat on the panel
wrote his own separate opinion. The majority felt that a
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute could not be
waived. The remaining judge felt that this could be waived and
that subject matter jurisdiction was therefore lacking.

No. 20040880

2

guilty plea could not act as a waiver or bar to raising this
claim for the first time on appeal. We disagree,
f9
An unconditional guilty plea waives any right the
defendant may have had to challenge the basis of his conviction
on its merits. The defendant's effort to describe the
constitutional challenge he raises as a challenge to the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court is simply without merit
as a tool for appealing the conviction after the plea has been
entered and the sentence imposed. The court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The opinion of the court
of appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.

KlO Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins'
opinion.
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice;
%1
Plaintiff Adolph Grimmett appeals from a denial of his
motion to withdraw several guilty pleas. The question raised by
this appeal stems from the intersection of the nunc pro tunc
resentencing remedy we outlined in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,
38 (Utah 1981), and Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b), which
establishes the time limitations governing motions to withdraw.
More specifically, we must determine whether a resentencing order
under Johnson extends the time during which a defendant may file
a motion to withdraw under section 77-13-6(2)(b). We conclude
that it does not and thus affirm.
BACKGROUND
^2
In December 2002, Grimmett was charged by information
with aggravated kidnapping, attempted automobile theft, assault,
and public intoxication. The charges arose from an incident at
the University of Utah during which Grimmett attacked a woman as
she was getting into her car. Grimmett's appointed counsel,

Robin Ljungberg, advised Grimmett that his ethnicity would
negatively affect his chances at trial. Ljungberg also stated
that the high-profile Elizabeth Smart case "would have an impact
on the jury." Grimmett followed Ljungberg's advice and pled
guilty to a reduced charge of attempted aggravated robbery,
attempted theft, and assault. The district court entered a final
judgment in March 2003 and sentenced Grimmett to consecutive
prison terms of varying lengths.
%3
Several months later, Grimmett began writing letters to
the district court complaining that Ljungberg had neither filed
an appeal nor moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, despite his
requests that Ljungberg do so. Ljungberg confirmed the truth of
these allegations, but the district court informed Grimmett that
it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the sentence and advised him
to appeal. The district court treated Grimmett's fourth letter
as a notice of appeal. The court of appeals subsequently
dismissed the appeal in July 2004, citing its untimeliness.
State v. Grimmett, 2 0 04 UT App 235U.
f4
In June 2 004, two weeks before the court of appeals
dismissed Grimmett's appeal, his newly appointed counsel filed a
petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act (the "PCRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110
(2002 & Supp. 2006), and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In his petition, Grimmett sought resentencing and
alternatively moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that
they had been involuntary.
^5
The State responded to Grimmett's post-conviction
petition by agreeing that he should be resentenced nunc pro tunc
pursuant to our decision in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38
(Utah 1981), thereby restoring his right to appeal. In January
2005, the district court ordered that Grimmett be resentenced.
Subsequent to the district court's resentencing order but prior
to the actual resentencing, Grimmett filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas or, in the alternative, to reduce the degrees of
the offenses prior to being resentenced. The district court
denied the motion and instead resentenced Grimmett nunc pro tunc,
ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Grimmett's motion
to withdraw his pleas.
f6
Grimmett filed a timely appeal. He subsequently filed
a motion with the court of appeals asking that it either
summarily reverse his convictions or order a remand hearing on
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under rule 23B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court of appeals denied
the motion and certified the appeal for transfer to this court.
We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (b) .
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ANALYSIS
%7 This appeal requires that we determine whether a
defendant timely files a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under
Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) when the motion is filed after
the district court has ordered that the defendant be resentenced
but before the actual resentencing. Stated differently, the
question before us is whether the application of the Johnson nunc
pro tunc resentencing remedy permits a defendant to withdraw his
guilty pleas under Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) , which
requires that a motion to withdraw a plea be made before
sentencing. We conclude that Grimmett's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea was untimely and thus affirm the district court's
denial of Grimmett's motion to withdraw.
%S Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) establishes the filing
limitations that govern a criminal defendant's right to withdraw
a guilty plea. These filing limitations are jurisdictional.
State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, % 20, 114 P.3d 585. Section
77-13-6(2)(b) "imposes a jurisdictional bar on late-filed motions
to withdraw guilty pleas," id. % 17, and failure to comply with
its requirements *extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge
the validity of the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002
UT 13, f 3, 40 P.3d 630. Grimmett must therefore comply with the
requirements of section 77-13-6(2)(b) if he seeks to challenge
the validity of his guilty pleas on appeal. See Manning v.
State, 2005 UT 61, f 36, 122 P.3d 628 ("Any challenge to [a
guilty plea] may only be undertaken following a timely motion for
withdrawal of the guilty plea.").
^9
Grimmett contends that his January 2 0 05 motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas met the jurisdictional requirements of
section 77-13-6(2) (b), despite the fact that it was filed twentytwo months after his sentencing. Because section 77-13-6(2) (b)
underwent substantial revision in May 2 003 and the parties
disagree about which version of the statute controls, we review
both versions and conclude that Grimmett's challenge fails under
both.
I.

THE 1989 VERSION OF UTAH CODE SECTION 77-13-6(2)(B)

HlO The prior version of section 77-13-6(2) (b) , which was
first adopted by the legislature in 1989 and remained in effect
at the time of Grimmett's original March 2003 sentencing, reads
as follows: "A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest is made by motion and shall be made within 3 0 days after
the entry of the plea" (emphasis added). Grimmett's motion,
filed almost two years after the entry of his guilty plea,
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clearly fails to meet the thirty-day jurisdictional requirement
of the 1989 statute. Grimmett nevertheless argues that we should
excuse his noncompliance, noting our statement that a
"presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general,
be liberally granted." State v. Galleaos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042
(Utah 1987). Galleaos is unavailing here, however, for two
reasons.
Ull First, Grimmett's January 2005 motion to withdraw was
not a "presentence motion," as it was filed twenty-two months
after the announcement of his sentence. Second, and more
importantly, we made the statement on which Grimmett relies while
reviewing the 1980 version of section 77-13-6, which imposed no
jurisdictional time limitations on motions to withdraw. That
version read: U A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn
only upon good cause shown and with leave of court." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) (amended 1989 & 2003); see also State v.
Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 994-96 (Utah 1993) (applying the 1980
version of the statute and holding that it potentially allowed a
criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea almost three years
after sentencing).
^Jl2 Section 77-13-6, however, was amended by the
legislature in 1989 to impose a strict jurisdictional time limit.
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) (1995) (amended 2003) (UA
request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry of the
plea."); see also Abevta, 852 P.2d at 955. While courts may
still "liberally grant" presentence motions to withdraw a guilty
plea, they may now do so only if they have jurisdiction. Under
the 1989 version of section 77-13-6(2)(b), the district court had
none.
II.

THE 2003 VERSION OF UTAH CODE SECTION 77-13-6(2) (B)

fl3 We now consider Grimmett's arguments within the context
of the 2003 version of section 77-13-6(2)(b). In doing so, we
find that the Johnson resentencing remedy is limited in nature
and purpose and does not allow Grimmett "another opportunity to
present postconviction motions." State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350,
356 (Utah 1996) .
A.

Background

1[14 Two months after Grimmett's original March 2003
sentencing, the legislature amended section 77-13-6(2) (b) to
remove the thirty-day limit and instead require that criminal
defendants file withdrawal motions before sentencing. As
amended, the statute reads: "A request to withdraw a plea of
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guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall
be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not
be announced unless the motion is denied." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003) (emphasis added).
fl5 The legislature apparently enacted this amendment in
response to our decision in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d
528. In Ostler, we interpreted the phrase "30 days after the
entry of the plea" to refer to the date of entry of final
judgment, not to the date of the plea colloquy. Id. K 11. We
reasoned that substantial unfairness might result from a plainlanguage reading of the 1989 statute: * [T]o start the time for
moving to withdraw a plea from the time the district court
accepted a plea could 'deprive the district court of the power to
review a plea before it enters a judgment of conviction and
sentence,' an outcome we found to be unreasonably unfair."
Merrill, 2005 UT 34, f 16 (quoting Ostler, 2001 UT 68, K 10).
Hl6 The 2003 amendment to section 77-13-6(2) (b) both
embraced and repudiated Ostler. It embraced Ostler7 s recognition
that it would be unfair to prevent criminal defendants from
moving to withdraw a guilty plea at any time before their
sentencing. CJL. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). It
repudiated Ostler, however, by setting sentencing as the deadline
for filing such motions. Under Ostler, a criminal defendant had
thirty days from nthe date of final disposition of the case" to
file a motion to withdraw. 2001 UT 68, H 11. The 2003 amendment
eliminates this possibility and instead mandates that any motion
to withdraw a plea be filed before sentence is announced.
B.

The Limited Nature and Purpose of the
Nunc Pro Tunc Resentencing Remedy

Ul7 In Grimmett's view, the district court's January 2005
order that he be resentenced nunc pro tunc reopened the section
77-13-6(2) (b) time frame and permitted him to file a motion to
withdraw at any time before the actual resentencing. In other
words, Grimmett reads the term "sentence" in the 2003 statute as
including a "resentence." He thus reads the 2003 statute as
meaning that w[a] request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by
motion before sentence [or resentence] is announced." We reject
this interpretation.
fl8 In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), we
instructed district courts to resentence criminal defendants nunc
pro tunc when those defendants were prevented from bringing
timely appeals through no fault of their own. Under Johnson,
nunc pro tunc resentencing restarted the appeal clock and
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provided defendants with an opportunity to bring direct appeals
of their convictions. Id. The Johnson nunc pro tunc
resentencing regime stood until our decision in Manning v. State,
2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, which was decided about two weeks
before Grimmett filed his initial brief in this case.
1(19 In Manning, we discarded nunc pro tunc resentencing in
light of the 1996 enactment of the PCRA, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002 & Supp. 2006), and corresponding
revisions to rules 65B and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. We concluded that "resentencing [was] no longer a
preferred remedy," in part because "resentencing tends to create
more problems than it resolves." Manning, 2 005 UT 61, ^| 28
(internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Grimmett's case
nicely illustrates the problematic nature of the Johnson remedy.
^2 0 Our opinion in Manning made clear that "the Johnson
remedy was ultimately designed to restore a denied right to
appeal." Id. Our decisions in both Manning and Johnson were
fashioned to address a single, key constitutional concern: " [W]e
must provide a readily accessible and procedurally simple method
by which persons improperly denied their right to appeal can
promptly exercise this right." Id. ^ 26; accord Johnson, 635
P.2d at 38 (w[If a] defendant was denied a constitutional right
[to a timely appeal, he] must be provided an opportunity to take
a direct appeal from his conviction."). Johnson and its progeny
thus established the limited scope and purpose of the nunc pro
tunc resentencing remedy.
f21 Our decision in State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah
1996), affirms the limited scope of the Johnson remedy. In
Gordon, a criminal defendant who had been resentenced nunc pro
tunc moved for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Id. at 353.
This court explained that the motion for a new trial was
untimely:
The only effect of the [resentencing] order
was to provide [the defendant] with another
opportunity to pursue the direct appeal that
he was previously denied. In other words,
[the defendant's] resentencing merely
returned him to the position he was in before
his appeal was dismissed. It did not allow
him another opportunity to present
postconviction motions.
Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
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^[22 Gordon relied in part on our decision in State v.
Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993), in which we explained
that M o ] n e e a trial court on habeas review determines that a
defendant has been denied the constitutional right to appeal, a
direct appeal should be provided immediately, without
adjudication of any other claims, such as ineffective assistance
of counsel" (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, Gordon
and Hallett both illustrate that nunc pro tunc resentencing is a
limited remedy designed to reinstate the crucial constitutional
right to appeal. In both cases, we expressly rejected the view
that the reinstatement of the right to appeal opened the door for
the consideration of post-conviction motions.
%23 The 2003 amendment to section 77-13-6(2)(b) did not
undercut our reasoning in Gordon. Under the 1989 statute, a
defendant was required to move to withdraw his plea "within 3 0
days after the entry of the [final judgment]." See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (b) (1995) (amended 2003); see also Ostler, 2001
UT 68, H 11. This time frame was changed by the 2003 statute,
which required that the motion be filed "before sentence is
announced." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) (2003). Though this
change is not insignificant, it does not render Gordon
inapplicable. Our holding in Gordon did not hinge on the thirtyday deadline imposed by the 1989 statute; it was based instead on
the limited scope and purpose of the nunc pro tunc resentencing
remedy. We fail to see how modification of the statutory
deadline bears on either the nature or the scope of the nunc pro
tunc resentencing remedy.
^[24 We therefore conclude that the district court's January
2 005 resentencing order did not reopen the filing window
established by section 77-13-6(2)(b). We expressly hold that the
Johnson nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy, which is no longer
available to criminal defendants, Manning, 2005 UT 61, K 11, does
not permit a criminal defendant to file a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea after the jurisdictional deadline established by
section 77-13-6(2)(b).
^[25 Because Grimmett's motion to withdraw was untimely
under both versions of section 77-13-6(2) (b) , we have no
jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the validity of his
guilty pleas. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^ 3, 40 P.3d 630
(MB]ecause [the defendant] did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea, we lack
jurisdiction to address [his challenge to his guilty plea] on
appeal.").
^[26 Our decision today does not leave Grimmett without a
remedy, however. Section 77-13-6(2) (c) (2003) expressly states
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that an untimely challenge to a guilty plea "shall be pursued
under" the PCRA and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.1 We further note that should Grimmett avail himself
of this remedy, he may be "appoint[ed] counsel on a pro bono
basis," Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(1) (2002). But see Hutchings
v. State, 2003 UT 52, ] 20, 84 P.3d 1150 (stating that defendants
have "no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a civil
petition for post-conviction relief"). Given the circumstances
that have led him to this point and the fact that the merits of
his argument have not yet been addressed, Grimmett appears to be
a prime candidate to benefit from the district court's discretion
to appoint counsel.
CONCLUSION
i|27 We affirm the district court's denial of Grimmett's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and hold that the Johnson
nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy does not permit him a second
bite at the apple under Utah Code section 77-13-6(2) (b) . Because
Grimmett did not file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas, we have no jurisdiction to consider his attack on their
validity. Affirmed.

f28 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's
opinion.

1

Grimmett has already petitioned for post-conviction
relief once, in June 2004. The State responded to that petition
by "erroneously indicat [ing] . . . that a challenge to
defendant's guilty pleas could be made on direct appeal through a
23B remand hearing." The State has indicated in its brief that
because of its error, it will "not move to dismiss a petition
challenging the validity of [Grimmett's] pleas as successive."
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(January 25, 2007)
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2007 UT App 23
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Third District, Salt Lake Department, 051907387
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
Attorneys:

Mary C. Corporon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Clifford Hudson appeals both his conviction
following a guilty plea to criminal non-support, a third degree
felony, and his sentence.
"A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest . . .
shall be made by motion before sentence is announced." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) (Supp. 2006) . Hudson did not move to
withdraw his guilty plea prior to the announcement of sentence.
He argues that the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel prevented
him from filing a timely motion to withdraw and he should be
allowed to develop that claim on appeal. However, failure to
file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes a
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on
appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1(3, 40 P.3d 630, including a
challenge to the guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of
counsel. See State v. Briggs, 2006 UT App 448,^6, 147 P.3d 969
("[B]ecause Defendant failed to timely file a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim."). Absent a timely
motion to withdraw, we lack jurisdiction to consider whether a
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in

connection with entry of a guilty plea.
See id.; see also State
v. Merrill, 2005 UT 3 4 , ^ 1 7 - 2 0 , 114 P.3d 585 (confirming that the
time limit in section 77-13-6 is jurisdictional). Any challenge
to a guilty plea not raised in a timely motion to withdraw must
be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule 65C of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(2) (c) .
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the
trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds
legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Hudson's sentence is within the statutory
range for a third degree felony, i.e., an indeterminate prison
term of zero-to-five years and a $5000 fine suspended upon
successful completion of probation. The court placed Hudson on
"thirty-six months probation to be extended until the entire
amount of restitution is [paid] in full," and required him to
serve 3 65 days in jail. The court required him to pay
restitution for his past due child support in the amount of
$118,483.72 as of August 2006, as incorporated in the plea
agreement. Utah Code section 76-3-201(4)(a) requires a court to
order restitution "for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201(4)(a) (Supp. 2006); see also id. § 77-38a-302(12)
(Supp. 2006) (requiring court to order restitution "for conduct
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as a part
of a plea bargain"). The court ordered Hudson to make payments
of $2000 per month to be applied to his ongoing child support and
restitution beginning thirty days after his release from jail.
His claim that the monthly amount due under the sentencing order
was $4000 is incorrect. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in requiring Hudson to pay restitution.
Hudson claims that the district court abused its discretion
by continuing probation until restitution is paid. He contends
that the court sentenced him "to a period of probation far in
excess of the time allowed by law, of 36 months."
See id. § 7718-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 2006) . However, the Utah Supreme Court
recently held that Utah Code section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) "does not
impose any limitation on the length of probationary term that a
court may impose" and that "the Utah Code imposes no statutory
time limitation on probation."
State v. Wallace, 2006 UT
86,^13,16, 567 Utah Adv. Rep. 41. In addition, a court may make
payment of victim restitution a condition of probation.
See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(a)(ix). Restitution payment may be
enforced through continuation of probation or through contempt
proceedings based upon failure to pay restitution.
See State v.
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Nones, 2000 UT App 211,^13, 11 P.3d 709.
section 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii) states:

In addition, Utah Code

If, upon expiration or termination of the
probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(I),
there remains an unpaid balance upon the
account receivable as defined in Section 763-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of
the case and continue the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of
enforcing the payment of the account
receivable.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (ii) (A) ; see also id. § 76-3201.1(1) (b) (Supp. 2006) (stating "Accounts receivable" includes
"restitution to victims"). The district court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering that probation would be extended until
restitution is paid.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it
seeks to challenge the guilty plea and conviction. We affirm the
sentencing order as entered by the district court.

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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Dear Ms. Collins,
This letter is offered pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
After the State filed its brief on July 31, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court decided State v.
Nicholls, 2006 UT 76,
P.3d , which is relevant to the State's argument that this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims. See Aple. Br. at 8-27. A copy of
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State v. NichollsUtah,2006.
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Craig NICHOLLS, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20050176.
Dec. 5, 2006.
Background: After defendant pled guilty in the
First District, Logan, Gordon J. Low, J., to
aggravated murder and was sentenced, the court
dismissed defendant's motion to withdraw his plea,
and denied his motion to correct illegal sentence
and arrest judgment. Defendant appealed.

Holding: The Supreme Court, Durham, C.J., held
that post-conviction relief, rather than a motion to
correct an illegal sentence, was the proper avenue to
challenge guilty plea.

Affirmed.
[1] Criminal Law 110 €^>1134(3)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General
HOkl 134(3) k. Questions Considered
in General. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court reviews questions of law for
correctness, granting no deference to the district
court.
[2] Sentencing and Punishment 350H €^>2222
350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HXII Reconsideration and Modification of
Sentence

350HXII(A) In General
350Hk2222 k. Existence of Other
Remedies. Most Cited Cases
Post-conviction relief, rather than a motion to
correct an illegal sentence, was the proper avenue
for defendant to challenge his guilty plea, based on
his allegedly impaired mental state at time of the
plea; defendant did not make any other challenge
concerning his sentence, and given that defendant
had already been sentenced, his challenge to his
guilty plea could only be pursued under the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Rules Crim.Proc,
Rule 22(e); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65C; West's
U.C.A. §77-13-6(2)(c).
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^1044.1(2)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in
Lower Court of Grounds of Review
110XXIV(E)1 In General
110kl044 Motion Presenting Objection
110kl044.1 In General; Necessity
of Motion
110kl044.1(2) k. Preliminary
Proceedings;
Indictment,
Information,
or
Complaint. Most Cited Cases
Appellate review is barred when the conviction
being challenged is in the form of a guilty plea and
the defendant attempts to withdraw that plea using a
motion to correct an illegal sentence. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e).
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik,
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Herm Olsen, Logan, for defendant.
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
*1 % 1 This case comes before us on appeal from
the district court's denial of a motion to correct an
illegal sentence. We affirm.

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

— P 3d —
... p 3d —-, 2006 W L 3488936 (Utah), 2006 U T 76
(Cite as: — P.3d — )

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1 2 On November 10, 2003, Craig Nicholls,
(Defendant) pled guilty to and was simultaneously
sentenced for the cume of aggravated murder On
December 1, 2003, Defendant, acting pro se, filed a
letter and document with the district court which the
court treated as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
The court dismissed the motion stating that it had
no jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section
77-13-6 and directed Defendant to pursue his claim
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and rule
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Then, on
November 15, 2004, Defendant, once again acting
pro se, filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence
and Arrest Judgment The motion was denied for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction Defendant
appealed, and counsel was appointed for purposes
of this appeal We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(i) (2002)

ANALYSIS
[1] 1f 3 The district court denied Defendant's
motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction This
presents a question of law, which we review for
correctness, granting no deference to the district
court Beaver County v Qwest, Inc, 2001 UT 81, H
8, 31 P 3d 1147
[2] H 4 This action was filed in the guise of a
motion to correct an illegal sentence under rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
However, the substance of the relief sought is the
withdrawal of Defendant's guilty plea due to lack of
a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights
[3] H 5 Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that "The court may correct an
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time " However, this court has held
that "an appellate court may not review the legality
of a sentence under rule 22(e) when the substance
of the appeal is
a challenge, not to the sentence
itself, but to the underlying conviction" State v
Brooks, 908 P 2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995), see also
State v Telfoid, 2002 UT 51, f 7, 48 P 3d 228,
State v Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, \ 8, 994 P 2d
© 2007 Thomson/West No

1243 Similarly, review is barred when the "
conviction" being challenged is in the form of a
guilty plea and the defendant attempts to withdraw
that plea using a rule 22(e) challenge State v Reyes,
2002 UT 13, H 3, 40 P 3d 630 In this case, the
substance of Defendant's appeal is a challenge to his
guilty plea based on his alleged "seriously impaired
mental state" at the time of the plea He does not
make any other challenge concerning his sentence
Thus, rule 22(e) is an improper avenue of relief for
Defendant's claims
1} 6 Furthermore, under Utah Code section
77-13-6(2)(b)
(Supp2006), "[a] request to
withdraw a plea of guilty
shall be made by
motion before sentence is announced" In
Defendant's case, he was sentenced immediately
after he entered his guilty plea and waived the
statutory time period during which he could have
withdrawn his plea Thus, Defendant's challenge to
his guilty plea, having been made outside the time
period specified by statute, can only "be pursued
under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post-Conviction
Remedies Act, and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure" Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6(2)(c), see
State v Merrill, 2005 UT 34, %% 1, 6-7, 13-20,
114 P 3d 585, Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3, 40 P 3d 630

*2 K 7 The Post-Conviction Remedies Act is thus
the proper, and only, avenue for relief now
available to Defendant We note that Defendant
may be entitled to counsel pursuant to Utah Code
section 78-35a-109

CONCLUSION
H 8 We affirm the district court's denial of
Defendant's motion Defendant must pursue his
claims under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and
rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
H 9 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice
DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice
NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM'S
opinion
Utah,2006
State v Nicholls
to Ong U S Govt Works.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050976-CA
v.
ROBERT OSORIO TENORIO,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from guilty pleas to communications fraud, a second degree
felony, and forgery, a third degree felony. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from second and third degree felony convictions under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does this Court have jurisdiction to review defendant's challenges to
his guilty pleas where he did not file a timely motion to withdraw his
pleas?
An appellate court's determination of whether it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal
is a question of law. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,f 18, 44 P.3d 663.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are attached at
Addendum A:
U.S. Const. Amend. VI;
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004);
Utah R. App. P. 4.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
In 1996, defendant obtained a social security card from a person on the street so
that he could obtain employment (R. 277:35). In fact, the card defendant obtained was a
counterfeit (R. 277:32). The number on the card, however, was "a validly issued social
security number issued to another individual" (R. 277:32). At the time, defendant
understood that "it was wrong to use that number" (R. 277:35-36).
In 1999, defendant used the social security card to apply for a mortgage guaranteed
by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") (R.
277:36; R. 335-40). In addition to the social security number, the card he presented also
contained his type-written name and signature (R. 340).
Documents received as part of the application included documents verifying
defendant's employment (R. 350-51). Those documents listed defendant's social security
number as the one on the card he obtained in 1996 (R. 350-51).
!

The facts of the crime are taken from defendant's preliminary hearing.
2

On January 28,1999, defendant closed on a Federal Housing Association loan in
the amount of $83,871.00, secured by a residence at 968 South 300 West, Salt Lake City,
Utah (R. 277:7, 14-17, 24-27; R. 342-44, 353-54). If the loan company had known that
defendant was using a false social security card, it would not have issued the loan (R.
277:12). If the title company had known that defendant was using a false social security
card, it would not have completed the closing (R. 277:26).
Defendant eventually defaulted on the loan (R. 277:7). As a result, HUD lost
$50,817 (R. 277:8).

On July 2,2004, defendant was charged with one count of communications fraud,
a second degree felony, or in the alternative, theft by deception, also a second degree
felony; and one count of forgery, a third degree felony (R. 2-8). After a preliminary
hearing, defendant was bound over as charged (R. 46-47).
On April 22,2005, a week before his scheduled trial, defendant entered into a plea
agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of
communications fraud, a second degree felony, and one count of forgery, a third degree
felony, and to pay restitution (R. 162). In return, the State agreed (1) not to file charges
"based upon state tax code violations"; (2) not to file identity theft or forgery charges
"arising from defendant's use of [the] social security number . . . [to secure his most

3

recent] employment"; (3) to recommend that any jail sentences be suspended in favor of
deportation; and (4) to recommend concurrent sentences for the two crimes (R. 169).
Before accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court explained to defendant the rights
he would be waiving by entering the pleas (R. 276:24). The court also explained that, "by
entering this plea,... you would be severely limiting your appeal rights" (R. 276:24).
After defendant confirmed that he understood "everything that was covered" in his
written plea statement, and that defendant was satisfied with the advice he had received
from his counsel, the court instructed defendant to sign his written plea statement (R.
276:26, 28; R. 161-74, 184-85). The plea statement signed by defendant stated, "I know
that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the
right to appeal my conviction and sentence.... I understand that I am giving up my right
to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty." (R. 167).
Before accepting defendant's pleas, the court also explained the statutory penalties
and elements of both communications fraud and forgery (R. 276:26-27). Concerning the
forgery charge, the court explained that, "[by your plea,] [y]ou're also admitting that on or
about January 1999 in Salt Lake County, with a purpose to defraud or understanding and
knowledge that j^ou were facilitating a fraud, you made or uttered a writing that purported
to be the act of somebody else" (R. 276:27). The court then asked, "Do you understand
that those are the things you would be admitting?" Defendant responded, "Yes" (R.
276:27).

4

Finally, the parties discussed the factual bases for defendant's pleas: That, "[u]sing
his own name but this fake social security number," defendant "represented that number
to be his own in order to obtain a HUD guaranteed loan for a house which he
subsequently defaulted on" (R. 276:21-22, 28-29).
After concluding that "[t]hose facts support the plea that has been entered," the
trial court accepted defendant's pleas as knowing and voluntary (R. 276:30). The court
then instructed defendant that "[a]ny attempt to withdraw [these] plea[s] would have to be
done in writing . . . and needs to be made before you are sentenced" (R. 276:30).
Defendant's written plea statement also informed him that any motion to withdraw his
pleas had to be made "before sentence is announced" (R. 171).
Defendant's original sentencing date of June 3, 2005, was reset to July 22, 2005
because the trial court had not received the presentence investigation report in time to
review it for the June hearing (R. 193-94). On July 22,2005, defendant was sentenced to
a suspended term of 365 days in jail. Defendant was placed on probation, ordered to pay
restitution, and ordered to surrender himself for deportation (R. 196-97).
Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty pleas before announcement of
sentence, nor did he appeal from the trial court's final judgment.
On August 22, 2005, the State filed a motion to correct defendant's sentences
because "[t]he sentence as currently worded does not indicate that the defendant was
sentenced to a suspended sentence of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison . . . for

5

the Third [D]egree Felony conviction nor a suspended sentence of one to fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison for the Second Degree Communications Fraud" (R. 200-02, 230-32,
248-51). Defendant opposed the State's motion (R. 221-24).
On October 7, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on the State's motion and
corrected defendant's sentences. At the same hearing, the court granted defense
counsel's motion to withdraw and appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association as
defendant's appellate counsel (R. 252-53).2
On October 20, 2005, defendant filed a notice of appeal (259-60). The record on
appeal was then supplemented to include exhibits presented by the State at defendant's
preliminary hearing (unnumbered signed minute entry filed April 24, 2006).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the trial
court, defendant challenges the validity of those guilty pleas on appeal. In raising his
claims, defendant acknowledges the multitude of cases holding that an appellate court
lacks jurisdiction to review a plea absent the filing of a timely motion to withdraw.
Defendant claims, however, that none of those cases apply here because "[t]he Utah
Supreme Court has never held in a case on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction

2

Although no signed order appears in the record, a signed order was attached to
defendant's Docketing Statement filed with this Court. The State therefore does not ask
this Court to dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction, but does ask this Court to order
defendant to make the trial court's final judgment a part of the record on appeal.
6

that it cannot conduct a plain error review of a guilty plea proceeding or assess a guilty
plea for ineffective assistance." Alternatively, defendant claims that any interpretation of
the plea statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b), that precludes review of his claims "on
direct appeal for failure to timely move to withdraw the guilty plea" is unconstitutional.
Defendant's appeal fails. First, defendant's case is not before this Court on direct
appeal from a judgment of conviction. Rather, it is before this Court on appeal from a
subsequent judgment on the State's motion to correct defendant's sentence. The supreme
court has held that appellate courts have no jurisdiction to consider a defendant's
challenges to his guilty pleas on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct an illegal
sentence. Under that precedent, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's
claims here.
Second, even if defendant's case were on direct appeal from his judgment of
conviction, this Court would still lack jurisdiction to consider his claims. Under Utah's
plea withdrawal statute and well-established law interpreting that statute, a defendant who
wants to challenge his guilty pleas on appeal must first file a timely motion to withdraw in
the trial court. If a defendant fails to file such a motion, appellate courts lack jurisdiction
to consider a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea on appeal, regardless of the rubric
under which he raises them. To the extent that defendant claims that such a scheme
unconstitutionally deprives him of his right to appeal (and the rights to counsel and due

7

process that accompany the right to appeal), defendant forfeited that claim when he
waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGES TO HIS GUILTY PLEAS WHERE
HE DID NOT FILE A TIMELY MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
PLEAS
Although defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the trial
court, defendant challenges those guilty pleas on appeal. In raising his claims, defendant
acknowledges the multitude of cases holding that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to
review a plea absent the filing of a timely motion to withdraw. Defendant claims,
however, that none of those cases apply here because "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has
never held in a case on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction that it cannot
conduct a plain error review of a guilty plea proceeding or assess a guilty plea for
ineffective assistance." Aplt Br. at 36.
Alternatively, defendant asserts that, "[t]o the extent current interpretation of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) precludes review of cases of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, plain error review for Rule 11 violations, and cases of exception circumstances on
direct appeal for failure to timely move to withdraw the guilty plea, such interpretation
violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guarantees the
right to counsel, violates the due process right to a knowing and voluntary plea, prevents

8

Rule 11 protections for defendants, and denies the right to a full and fair appeal." Aplt.
Br. at 36.
Defendant's jurisdictional claims fail on multiple grounds. First, defendant's
appeal is not from his original judgment of conviction. Rather, his appeal is from a
subsequent judgment on a motion to correct defendant's sentences. In a case directly on
point, the supreme court has held that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider
challenges to guilty pleas for the first time on appeal from such judgments.
Second, even if defendant's appeal was a direct appeal from his convictions,
Utah's plea withdrawal statute and well-established law interpreting that statute clearly
preclude this Court from considering challenges to guilty pleas absent the timelyfilingof
a motion to withdraw, regardless of the rubric under which he raises them. To the extent
defendant claims that such an interpretation of the plea statute violates his constitutional
right to an appeal, defendant waived that claim when he waived his right to appeal as part
of his plea agreement.
A.

This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenges to his
guilty pleas on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct sentence.

Defendant claims that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his challenges to his
guilty pleas because, contrary to the multitude of cases precluding defendants from
challenging their pleas on appeal from the denial of untimely motions to withdraw, his
case is on direct appeal from afinaljudgment of conviction. See Aplt. Br. at 36-41.
Defendant's appeal, however, is not from a final judgment of conviction. Rather, it is a
9

from a final judgment on a motion to correct defendant's sentence, and binding precedent
holds that appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to guilty pleas on
appeal from such judgments.
1.

Defendant's notice of appeal was not timely to perfect an appeal
from the trial court'sfinaljudgment of conviction.

As a general rule, "[i]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right
from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal... shall be filed with the
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This 30-day deadline is jurisdictional. See State
v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100,15, 57 P.3d 1065 ("This court has previously recognized that
the 30-day period for filing notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . is jurisdictional")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although rule 4(b) provides exceptions to the general rule when "a party timely
files" certain enumerated motions, none of those motions were filed in defendant's case.
Utah R. App. P. 4(b). And, although rule 4(e) allows the trial court to extend the time for
filing a notice of appeal under limited circumstances, see id. 4(e), defendant never
requested an extension here.
Consequently, under rule 4(a), defendant had thirty days from entry of the trial
court's final judgment of conviction to perfect a direct appeal from that judgment.
A final judgment on defendant's convictions was entered on July 22, 2005 (R. 196-97).
Under rule 4, then, defendant had until August 22, 2005, to file a notice of appeal if he
10

wished to challenge his sentences.3 See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Defendant did not file a
notice of appeal, however, until October 20,2005—59 days later (R. 259-60).
Defendant's notice of appeal, therefore, did not perfect an appeal from the trial court's
final judgment of conviction.
Defendant's notice did, however, perfect an appeal from the trial court's
subsequent judgment responding to the State's motion to correct defendant's sentences.
The State filed its motion on August 22, 2005 (R. 200-02, 230-32, 248-51). After a
hearing, the trial court entered a final judgment correcting defendant's sentences on
October 7, 2005 (R. 252-53). On October 20, 2005, defendant filed a notice of appeal
indicating that he was appealing "from the final judgment/order rendered against him on
the 7th day of October, 2005" (R. 259-60). Defendant's notice of appeal was filed within
thirty days of the trial court's final judgment correcting defendant's sentences. Thus, his
notice did perfect an appeal from that judgment. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a).
Notwithstanding, defendant does not challenge the trial court's judgment
correcting his sentences on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 13-36. Rather, defendant challenges
the validity of his guilty pleas underlying those sentences. See id. As stated, defendant's
notice of appeal is untimely as to those claims. This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to
consider his claims.

3

Thirty days from July 22, 2005, was actually August 21, 2005. However, August
.21,2005, fell on a Sunday. Thus, defendant had until the following business day, August
22,2005, to file his notice of appeal.
11

2.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that an appellate court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea
on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct sentences.

This Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims under State v.
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630. Reyes entered guilty pleas to rape of a child and
sodomy of a child. Id. at f L Like defendant here, Reyes never filed a motion to
withdraw his pleas or a timely notice of appeal from thefinaljudgment concerning those
pleas. Id. Rather, after the time for filing either of those had expired, Reyes filed a
motion to correct his sentence. Id. When the trial court denied Reyes' motion, Reyes
appealed. Id. at f 2.
For the first time on appeal, Reyes attacked his guilty pleas, "arguing that the trial
court committed plain error by failing to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure." Id. at^f 3. The supreme court "decline[d] to address [Reyes' claim]
because we do not have jurisdiction to address it." Id.
As the supreme court explained, settled law provides that a defendant must "move
for a withdrawal [of a guilty plea] in the district court before he can challenge a plea on
appeal." Id. (quoting State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, Tf 10, 31 P.3d 528). A defendant's
failure to file a timely motion to withdraw "extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge
the validity of the guilty plea on appeal." Id. at ^f 3 (citing State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,
995 (Utah 1993); State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 10, 31 P.3d 528 (quoting State v.
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,1067 (Utah 1993))).
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When Reyes, like defendant here, argued that the court could nonetheless review
his plea "if plain error or exceptional circumstances exist/' the supreme court rejected that
claim. Id. at % 4. As the court explained, "[t]his court may choose to review an issue not
properly preserved for plain error. It cannot, however, use plain error to reach an issue
over which it has no jurisdiction." Id.
The supreme court's holding in Reyes is consistent with precedent discussing the
procedures applicable to withdrawal of guilty pleas. See id. atfflf3-4 (discussing
precedent); see also State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,ffif15-17, 114 P.3d 585 (same). It is
also consistent with precedent precluding defendants from challenging their convictions
through motions to correct sentences brought under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, Tf 7, 48 P.3d 228 (holding
that "a defendant may not employ rule 22(e) to attack the underlying conviction"); State v.
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, \ 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (holding that court of appeals erred in
concluding that rule 22(e) allowed it to reach claim challenging legality of defendant's
conviction); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (holding that "[a] request to
correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) presupposes a valid conviction," and,
"[tjherefore, issues concerning the validity of a conviction are not cognizable under rule
22(e)").
Reyes disposes of the jurisdictional question here. As in Reyes, defendant never
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Rather, as in Reyes, defendant challenges his
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guilty pleas for the first time on appeal from a judgment on a motion to correct sentence.
Just as the supreme court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's claims in Reyes,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claims here.
"Once a court has determined that it lacks jurisdiction, it 'retains only the authority
to dismiss the action.'" State v. Yardley, 2004 UT App 47,15, 87 P.3d 749 (quoting
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)).
B.

Even if defendant's appeal were from his judgment of conviction, this
Court would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to consider his claims.

But, even if defendant were directly appealing from his convictions, this Court
would nonetheless lack jurisdiction to consider his claims.
1.

Under settled law, defendant's failure to file a timely motion to
withdraw in the trial court divests this Court of jurisdiction to
consider his challenges on appeal.

Under well-established law, any defendant who wishes to challenge his guilty
pleas in the criminal proceeding must first file a timely motion to withdraw his pleas. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2);4 see also State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, \ 30, 114 P.3d 585
(holding that plea statute offers only two means by which to challenge plea—through
motion to withdraw filed within statutory period and petition for post-conviction relief

4

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004), provides:
(2) (b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made by motion before
sentence is announced....
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, Post Conviction Remedies
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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filed after statutory period); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 4, 40 P.3d 630; State v.
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,1067 (Utah 1993) (holding that defendant must move to
withdraw his plea in the trial court before he can challenge that plea on appeal),
abrogation on other grounds recognized in State v. Manning, 2005 UT 61, f 25, 122 P.3d
628.
Under that same well-established law, if a defendant fails to file a timely motion in
the trial court, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider his claims. See Merrill, 2005
UT 34, \ 20 (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court has jurisdiction over untimely
motion to withdraw); State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, If 13, 31 P.3d 528 (noting jurisdictional
nature of plea statute); State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (holding, under
prior plea statute, that "the plea statute limits a defendant's right to withdraw his or her
guilty plea to thirty days after entry of the plea" and that, "[thereafter, the right is
extinguished"); State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996) ("[I]f a defendant
is advised of the deadline when the plea is entered, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
consider a motion to withdraw filed after the thirty-day period."); State v. Price, 837 P.2d
578, 583 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that statutory period for filing motion to withdraw is
jurisdictional), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, \ 11, 31 P.3d
528; see also State v. Huynh, 2006 UT App 273U, *1 (June 29, 2006) (per curiam)
("Because Huynh failed to file a timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea, the district
court correctly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to consider her motion."); State
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v. Helbach, 2004 UT App 388U, *2 (Oct. 28, 2004) (per curiam) (holding, under
amended statute, that "trial court lacked jurisdiction" to consider defendant's motion to
withdraw where motion was filed after announcement of sentence) (copies of unpublished
decisions attached at Addendum B).
And, as stated, under that same well-established law, "failure to [file a timely
motion in the trial court also] extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of
the guilty plea on appeal." Reyes, 2002 UT \3,\3\see

also Manning, 2005 UT 61, ^[f 36

(rejecting claim that "defendants who enter guilty pleas remain entitled to [their full
constitutional] right to appeal"; holding that challenges to pleas "may only be undertaken
following a timely motion to withdraw"); Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ^ 20 (holding that
"jurisdictional implications of section 77-13-6(2)(b) are independent of the court whose
jurisdiction the defendant seeks to invoke."); Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067 (holding that
defendant must first file motion to withdraw in trial court before appellate court may
consider claims on appeal); Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995 (holding that "the plea statute limits a
defendant's right to withdraw his or her guilty plea" and that, "thereafter, the right is
extinguished"); State v. Lebow, 2006 UT App 27U, *1 (Feb. 2, 2006) (per curiam)
(holding, under new statute, that "[a]bsent a timely motion to withdraw, appellate courts
lack jurisdiction to consider any issue attacking the guilty plea itself, including whether a
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea agreement"); State v.
Mallen, 2005 UT App 443U, *1 (Oct. 14, 2005) (per curiam) (holding, under new statute,
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that "[t]his court lacks jurisdiction to address plea issues on appeal absent a timely motion
to withdraw"); State v. Sousa, 2003 UT App 320U, * 1 (Sept. 25,2003) (per curiam)
(holding that "section 77-13-6 does not permit this court, in this direct appeal,... to set
aside defendant's plea

") (copies of unpublished decisions attached at Addendum B).

In this case, defendant never moved to withdraw his pleas in the trial court.
Consequently, under well-established law, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
defendant's claims. As discussed below, defendant's contentions otherwise lack merit
2.

Defendant's contention that this Court may hear his claims
because he appeals directly from his convictions fails, where he
waived his right to appeal his convictions as part of his plea
agreement.

Defendant acknowledges that this Court has repeatedly held, based on the wellestablished law discussed above, that it lacks jurisdiction to consider challenges to guilty
pleas on direct appeal from judgments of conviction. See Aplt. Br. at 40-41; see also
State v. Latu, 2004 UT App 437U, *l-2 (per curiam) (rejecting defendant's contention
that "denial of a direct appeal from the plea would result in violations of his constitutional
rights"; holding that "[b]ecause Latu failed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
this court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal"); State v. King, 2004 UT App 79U, * 1 (per
curiam) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to consider challenges to guilty plea on direct
appeal absent timely motion to withdraw) (copies of unpublished decisions attached at
Addendum B).
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However, defendant contends that this Court nonetheless has jurisdiction because
"[t]he Utah Supreme Court has never held in a case on direct appeal from the judgment of
conviction that it cannot conduct a plain error review of a guilty plea proceeding or assess
a guilty plea for ineffective assistance." Aplt. Br. at 36-41 (attempting to distinguish
Reyes and Merrill because they involved appeals from a judgment on motion to correct
illegal sentences and a judgment denying an untimely motion to withdraw, respectively).
Defendant's claim lacks merit.
In its simplest terms, defendant contends that because he—unlike the numerous
other defendants who filed untimely motions to withdraw—disregarded the statutory
requirement of filing a motion to withdraw altogether, he should have the right to
challenge his guilty pleas on direct appeal, even though those other defendants—who at
least attempted to adhere to the statute—did not. Defendant's contention is contrary to
every recent Utah appellate court decision on this issue, all of which steadfastly require
the filing of a timely motion to withdraw before challenges to guilty pleas may be
considered on appeal.
The supreme court's recent decision in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585,
most directly disposes of defendant's claim. Merrill appealed from the denial of an
untimely motion to withdraw. Merrill asserted first that any statutory limit on filing
motions to withdraw was directory, not jurisdictional; thus, the trial court erred in denying
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his motion as untimely. Id. at % 13. Alternatively, Merrill claimed that the plea statute's
time limit on filing motions to withdraw was unconstitutional. Id. at 21.
In rejecting Merrill's claims, the supreme court noted that "[t]he right to seek
withdrawal of a guilty plea" is a right "granted by statute" that is "without express
constitutional protection." Id. at ^ 45. As such, the legislature has the authority to
statutorily determine what procedures a defendant must follow in order to challenge his
pleas. See id. at f 47 (rejecting claim that plea statute violated separations of power
provision of constitution).
The court then noted that the plea statute "provides [only] two opportunities to
challenge the validity of a guilty plea: a motion to withdraw the plea, which must be
brought within the . . . statutory window, and an action for post-conviction relief, which
may be brought after the expiration of the . . . statutory period." Id. at f 30. It does not
provide a defendant with the right to challenge his plea on direct appeal from his
convictions. Id, at \ 44 (recognizing that plea statute replaces direct appeal as means by
which defendants may "challenge their guilty pleas").
In other words, under the first option provided by the plea statute, a defendant
must "move for a withdrawal in the district court before he can challenge a plea on
appeal." Id. at % 17 (quoting State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, Tf 3, 40 P.3d 630 (quoting State
v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 10, 31 P.3d 528 (citing State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067
(Utah 1993)))) (emphasis added).
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The clear import of Merrill, and indeed the prior cases upon which it relies, is that
the only procedures by which a defendant may challenge a guilty plea are the two
procedures provided by the plea statute. And, if a defendant does not file a timely motion
to withdraw under the first procedure, he cannot sidestep the jurisdictional bar of the
statute simply by filing a direct appeal from his convictions. See also Reyes, 2002 UT 13,
f 3 ("We have held that failure to [file a timely motion to withdraw] extinguishes a
defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal"); Merrill, 2005 UT
34, \ 20 (holding that "jurisdictional implications of section 77-13-6(2)(b) are
independent of the court whose jurisdiction the defendant seeks to invoke."); Johnson,
856 P.2d at 1067 (holding that defendant must first file motion to withdraw in trial court
before appellate court may consider claims on appeal); Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995 (holding
that "the plea statute limits a defendant's right to withdraw his or her guilty plea" and
that, "thereafter, the right is extinguished").
Rather, the defendant's only option is to proceed with a post-conviction petition.
See Merrill, 2005 UT 34,fflf21-47 (holding that plea statute providing that defendants
who fail to file a timely motions to withdraw may only challenge their pleas through postconviction proceeding does not violate constitutional rights of open courts, separation of
powers, due process, equal protection, uniform operation of laws, right to counsel).
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628—a case completely ignored by
defendant—confirms that conclusion. Manning entered guilty pleas pursuant to a plea
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bargain. Fifty-seven days after final judgment, Manning filed a pro se notice of appeal
which the trial court dismissed as untimely. Manning, 2005 UT 61, ^ 2-5.
In a post-conviction petition, Manning claimed that her attorney had failed to
inform her of her right to appeal and "that, as a result," her constitutional right to appeal
had been violated. Id. at \ 6. After the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial
of Manning's petition, the supreme court granted certiorari, first, to reconsider the
procedure defendants must follow in order to revive their right to appeal in cases where
that right has been violated and, second, to determine "whether a defendant's request for
resentencing must be granted unless the record demonstrates that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal, and, if so, whether Manning
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal in this case." Id. at \ 9.
After redefining the procedure defendants must follow in order to revive a lost
right to appeal, see id. atffif26-31, the supreme court addressed whether Manning had
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal her convictions, id. at 32. In doing
so, the supreme court rejected Manning's contention that "defendants who enter guilty
pleas remain entitled to the article I, section 12 right to appeal." Id. at ^f 36. The court
held that "Manning waived the right to appeal her conviction[s] by entering a knowing
and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement that expressly indicated she would
waive her right to appeal." Id. at ^f 37. Consequently, "Manning could only contest this
waiver by first filing a timely motion to withdraw her guilty pleas and then establishing

21

that her pleas were not knowing and voluntary." Id. (citing State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f
3, 40 P.3d 630). Without first filing a timely motion to withdraw, "she could not appeal
her conviction or the knowing and voluntary nature of her guilty plea"; rather, "any
remaining rights to appeal were necessarily limited to appealing her sentence." Id.
Manning was not a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction. However, citing
one of the very jurisdictional cases defendant now attempts to avoid, Manning clearly
addressed what issues a defendant could raise in such an appeal after entering a guilty
plea pursuant to an agreement in which the defendant waived his right to appeal. See
Manning, 2005 UT 61,ffif36-37 (citing Reyes, 2002 UT 13,13).
Manning also precludes defendant's appeal here. Defendant's written plea
statement stated that "I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a
jury or judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence.... I
understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty." (R.
167). Moreover, during the plea hearing, the trial court specifically told defendant that,
"by entering this plea,... you would be severely limiting your appeal rights," as
"explained in more detail in [the plea agreement]" (R. 276:24).
Thus, like Manning, defendant "waived the right to appeal [his] conviction by
entering a knowing and voluntary guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement that expressly
indicated [he] would waive [his] right to appeal." Manning, 2005 UT 61, ^ 37.
Consequently, like Manning, defendant "could not appeal [his] conviction or the knowing
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and voluntary nature of [his] guilty plea" without first filing a timely motion to withdraw
in the trial court. Id. Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his pleas in the trial
court, let alone a timely one. Thus, consistent with Manning and the foregoing authority,
this Court cannot hear his claims.
3.

Defendant's contention that this Court may hear his claims
because, otherwise, the plea statute unconstitutionally deprives
him of his right to appeal fails, where he waived his right to
appeal as part of his plea agreement.

Alternatively, defendant contends that, "[t]o the extent current interpretation of
[Utah's plea withdrawal statute] precludes review of cases of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims,... and cases of exceptional circumstances on direct appeal for failure to
timely move to withdraw the guilty plea," Aplt. Br. at 36, that interpretation should be
overruled because it "violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
which guarantees the right to counsel, violates the due process right to a knowing and
voluntary plea,... and denies the right to a full and fair appeal." Aplt. Br. at 36, 41.5

5

Although defendant raises rule 11 claims as one of the bases for his constitutional
challenge, see Aplt. Br. at 45 (asserting that denial of his right to raise rule 11 challenges
on appeal is unconstitutional "because a defendant cannot bring all rule 11 plain error
violations in post conviction relief), his reliance on rule 11 is misplaced. Before 2003,
the plea statute provided that "[a] plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a)
(1999). Utah courts uniformly held that a trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule
11(e) constituted "good cause" under the plea withdrawal statute. See, e.g., State v.
Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, ^ 6, 68 P.3d 1035 (holding that defendant may generally
withdraw plea where trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11); State v. Smith, 812
P.2d 470,476 (Utah App. 1991) ("[A] trial court errs when it refuses to allow the
withdrawal of a guilty or no contest plea that was not entered in strict compliance with
23

Although defendant attempts to present his constitutional claims as three distinct
claims—denial of the right to an appeal, denial of the right to effective assistance of
counsel, and denial of the right to due process—his argument as a whole indicates that his
latter two claims are subsumed in the first.
Specifically, the logic of defendant's argument appears to be that (1) because a
defendant has the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal
from a conviction but not in a post-conviction proceeding, see Aplt. Br. at 41, 45, denying
defendant the right to a direct appeal necessarily also denies him the right to effective

Rule 11.").
In 2003, however, the Legislature amended the plea statute to provide that a guilty
plea "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004).
This is the same standard necessary to prove that a plea is unconstitutional. See
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (holding that due process requires
that plea be "equally voluntary and knowing"). It is also the same showing a defendant
must make when he challenges the validity of guilty pleas in proceedings brought under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (West 2004)
(providing that defendant may petition for post-conviction relief if "the conviction was
obtained . . . in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution").
And, because "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does
not in itself amount to a violation of a defendant's rights under either the Utah or the
United States Constitution," Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993), such a
failure is no longer, by itself, sufficient to withdraw a plea. In other words, under the
prior plea statute, a defendant could withdraw his plea if he could show error in the taking
of the plea under rule 11, because a rule 11 violation constituted "good cause." Under the
new statute, however, that claim is no longer available because a rule 11 violation, by
itself, does not establish an unknowing and involuntary plea.
Thus, defendant's contention that the inability to challenge pleas on direct appeal
is unconstitutional because it "foreclose^]" certain rule 11 claims that would otherwise
be available, see Aplt. Br. at 45, is simply no longer correct.
24

assistance of counsel that would accompany the appeal; and (2) because a defendant
presumably would have the due process right to counsel and to assert all his challenges on
direct appeal, but not in a post-conviction proceeding, see Aplt. Br. at 36, 42, 45,46,
denying him the right a direct appeal would also deny him the right to due process.
In other words, defendant's contention is that an interpretation of the plea statute that
denies him the right to directly appeal his guilty pleas is unconstitutional because it
"leaves a defendant without the right and benefit to a foil and fair appeal," id. at 46,
including the right to challenge the pleas on due process and rule 11 grounds and the
benefit of constitutionally effective assistance of counsel, id. at 41.
Under Manning, however, defendant waived his constitutional right to an appeal
when he entered his pleas "pursuant to a plea agreement that expressly waive[d] the right
to appeal." State v. Manning, 2005 UT 61, f 36,122 P.3d 628; see also pp. 20-23 supra
(discussing express waiver of right to appeal contained in defendant's written plea
statement). He therefore also waived any due process and effective assistance rights that
would have attached to that appeal.
And because defendant waived his right to appeal his convictions as part of his
plea agreement, he has no standing to challenge the plea statute on the basis that it
unconstitutionally denies him the right to appeal. Specifically, defendant cannot show
that he "has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable" to the
alleged unconstitutionality of the plea statute. Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT
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14, <[ 9, 86 P.3d 735 (discussing "basic requirements of standing"). Thus, he cannot show
"that a favorable decision [on his constitutional claim] is likely to redress [that] injury."
Id
In any case, defendant's constitutional claim fails. "To prevail on any of his
constitutional claims, [defendant] must overcome the presumption that [the plea statute,]
section 77-13-6 is constitutional." State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, \ 22, 114 P.3d 585.
Here, defendant cannot overcome that presumption of constitutionality because he fails to
address the supreme court's decision in Merrill, which upheld the constitutionality of the
plea statute against multiple constitutional challenges. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, \ 32
(rejecting Merrill's claim that plea statute is unconstitutional because it allows some
defendants to challenge their pleas with the right to counsel and forces others to challenge
their pleas in post-conviction proceedings in which appointment of counsel is
discretionary); id, at *| 30 (rejecting Merrill's claim that plea statute violates due process
because it "unconstitutionally impedes his opportunity to bring his claim that his plea was
not knowing and voluntary before a court" where the statute "provides a meaningful
opportunity for a hearing before the district court, regardless of whether the [statutory
time] limit [for filing a motion to withdraw] was met"); id. at f 45 (suggesting that plea
statute precluding direct appeal of convictions is not unconstitutional so long as statute
"afford[s] defendants the opportunity to challenge their guilty pleas"); see Aplt. Br. at 3940 (discussing procedural posture of Merrill but failing to acknowledge, let alone
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distinguish, the constitutional holdings of the supreme court in that case); see also State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 399 (Utah 1994) (holding that "[t]hose asking [court] to
overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion" and that they can
succeed only if court becomes '"clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous
or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will
come by departing from precedent'") (citations omitted).
Consequently, defendant's constitutional claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to dismiss defendant's appeal
for lack of jurisdiction or to otherwise affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 3[_ July 2006.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. K L U C Z N I K )
Assistant Attorney General

27

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on Zl July 2006,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Josie E. Brumfield, Salt
Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
Attorney for Appellant.

/rU/i-^y

28

Addenda

Addendum A
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United States Const, Amend. VI
A m e n d m e n t VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

United States Const., Amend. XIV
A m e n d m e n t XIV. Citizenship; privileges and immunities; due process;
equal protection; apportionment of representation; disqualification of
officers; public debt; enforcement
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.

Utah Const., Art. I, §12
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband/nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004)
§ 77-13-6.

Withdrawal of plea

(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced.
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, PostConviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Utah R. App. P. 4
R U L E 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the
order disposing of the motion:
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules'lof Civil
Procedure;
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted,
under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; or
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but
before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be
treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such
a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To
appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party
must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after
the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the
judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.

(f) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined
in an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of
appeal.
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aggravated robbery in August 2003.
Helbach completed a statement in support
of his guilty plea, giving the factual basis
for his plea and waiving specific rights,
including his right to appeal. The
document also specified that he could
withdraw his plea only on good cause
shown, and that he must file a motion to
withdraw
his
plea
before
the
announcement of sentence. Helbach was
sentenced in September 2003.
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Pro Se.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges
ORME.

BENCH,

DAVIS,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Aaron Helbach appeals the trial court's
denial of his motion to be resentenced.
This is before the court on the State's
motion for summary disposition based on
lack of jurisdiction.
Helbach pleaded guilty to a charge of

In March 2004, Helbach filed a motion for
resentencing in the trial court in his
criminal case. Helbach asserted that he was
incompetent at the time of his plea, and
thus the plea was invalid. The trial court
denied the motion on its merits, finding
there was no indication that Helbach was
not fully capable of entering a knowing
and voluntary plea, and that the mental
evaluation from the State did not indicate
any disorder that would impact his
competency. The trial court also noted the
motion was filed several months after
sentencing, but did "not address [the]
timeliness of the Motion."
Helbach asserts that his motion was filed "
under the philosophy" of State v. Rees,
2003 UT App 4, 63 P.3d 120, cert, granted,
73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003), which permitted
a defendant to file a motion for
resentencing in the sentencing court under
particular circumstances. Helbach has
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apparently seized on Rees to avoid going
through the procedures for post-conviction
relief as set forth in the Utah
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Act), Utah
Code sections 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002),
and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C.
However, after Rees, this court has held
that requests to be resentenced to permit a
renewal of an opportunity to appeal fall
squarely within rule 65C and the Act, See
State v. Manning, 2004 UT App 87,f 21,
89 P.3d 196, cert granted, 2004 Utah
LEXIS 172(UtahAug. 11,2004).

request to withdraw a plea "shall be made
by motion before sentence is announced."
Id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant does not
timely request to withdraw his plea, any
challenge to the plea must be made
pursuant to rule 65C and the Act. See id. §
77-13-6(2)(c).

Additionally, Helbach has not shown that
he comes within the scope of Rees. In Rees,
this court held that extraordinary relief
may be available in the sentencing court if
a defendant has been denied the effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. See Rees,
2003 UT App 4 at If 6. Such relief,
however, is available only in "limited
circumstances, to modify or vacate a
judgment where extra-record facts show
that the defendant has been deprived of his
constitutional right to a fair trial or
meaningful appeal." Id. at ^f 13. Helbach
waived his right to a trial and appeal by
pleading guilty and does not come within
the narrow scope of Rees.
Instead, Helbach's motion is governed by
Utah Code section 77-13-6, providing for
the methods of challenging a guilty plea.
Section 77-13-6 provides that a guilty plea
"may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2003). A

*2
Helbach's
motion
requested
resentencing, but attacked the validity of
his plea, arguing he was incompetent. The
trial court addressed the merits, finding
that Helbach was not incompetent at his
plea. The trial court also noted, but did not
rule on, the late filing of the motion. In
substance, Helbach's motion was a motion
to withdraw his plea, and the trial court
considered it as such. However, under
section 77-13-6, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider the motion because
it was made months after sentence was
announced. Section 77-13-6 limits a
defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea
to the time before the announcement of
sentence. See id. § 77-13-6(2)(b). "
Thereafter, the right is extinguished." State
v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)
(holding that failure to file a timely motion
for withdrawal extinguishes the right). The
timely filing of a notice to withdraw a plea
is jurisdictional. See State v. Reyes, 2002
UT13,Tfl[3-4,40P.3d630.
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over
Helbach's motion, and thus this court
likewise lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.
See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,
678-79 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Accordingly,
this appeal is dismissed.

© 2006 Thomson/West. No CI im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Aaron P. Dodd, Provo, for Appellant.
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andTHORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Appellant Shelly Huynh appeals the
Ruling
on Defendant's
Motion to
Withdraw Plea, Motion to Change Plea
and Motion to Dismiss.
Huynh was originally charged with a single
count of aggravated arson, a first degree
felony. On January 26, 2001, she pleaded

guilty to one count of attempted arson, a
third degree felony. On April 27, 2001, the
district court sentenced her to an
indeterminate term of no more than five
years in prison, stayed that term, and
placed her on probation. Both the caption
and body of the sentencing order refer to
the offense as "Attempted Aggravated
Arson," a third degree felony. On June 27,
2001, the court entered a revised sentence
incorporating a restitution amount and
ordering the sentence to remain as
previously imposed. On July 14, 2003,
Huynh filed a notice of appeal, seeking to
challenge her conviction. This court
dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction due to the untimely notice of
appeal. See State v. Huynh 2003 UT App
338 (per curiam). In 2004, the district court
revoked Huynh's probation and reinstated
her prison sentence. The judgment
indicates that the offense was "Attempted
Aggravated Arson (amended)," a third
degree felony.
In July 2005, Huynh sought to withdraw
her guilty plea on several grounds,
including a claim that she actually entered
a not guilty plea. She also claimed that she
pleaded guilty to attempted arson, but the
district court entered a guilty plea to
attempted aggravated arson, which she
claims rendered her guilty plea and
resulting conviction invalid. The district
court denied the motion for lack of
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jurisdiction because Huynh did not file a
timely motion to withdraw her 2001 guilty
plea. Because Huynh sought withdrawal of
her guilty plea, instead of correction of the
error in describing her offense, the court
did not correct that error.™1

Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). "
Therefore, issues concerning the validity of
a conviction are not cognizable under rule
22(e)." Id. Because Huynh failed to file a
timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea,
the district court correctly concluded that it
did not have jurisdiction to consider her
motion. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,If
31, 40 P.3d 630 (holding that failure to file
a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea
extinguishes the right to challenge the
validity of the plea on appeal).

FN1. On stipulation of the parties,
the district court later entered an
order intended to correct the error.
The district court's order describes
the error as a "caption error." In
fact, the error also appears in the
body of the original sentence.
Because Huynh did not appeal from
the order or seek the remedy of
correction
of
any
error
in
sentencing orders, we do not
consider any issues regarding that
order in this appeal.
Huynh now asserts that she entered a guilty
plea to attempted arson, but she was
illegally sentenced to attempted aggravated
arson. On that basis, she contends that she
is entitled to withdraw her plea and have
her conviction vacated. There is no time
limit for bringing a motion to correct an
illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may
correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."
). However, Huynh is mistaken in her
assertion that rule 22(e) provides a means
to challenge her guilty plea and conviction.
"A request to correct an illegal sentence
presupposes a valid conviction." State v.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

*2 Huynh's reliance on State v. Arviso,
1999 UT App 381, 993 P.2d 894, is
misplaced. In Arviso, the district court
suspended a defendant's prison sentence on
the condition that he remain out of the
United States, which was an illegal
sentence. Noting that an illegal sentence
may be corrected at any time, we stated
that a court retains jurisdiction over a
defendant until a valid sentence is
imposed. See id. at f 8. However, we
concluded that because the plea agreement
in that case was based upon both parties'
mistaken assumption that the court could
impose a particular sentence, the plea
bargain could not be enforced. Id. at ^f 10.
The sentence in Huynh's case was a valid
sentence for the third degree felony of
attempted arson, and there is no
demonstration that the plea bargain
contemplated a particular sentence that
later proved to be illegal.
We affirm the order of the district court.
UtahApp.,2006.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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King did not file a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas; nevertheless, he
seeks to challenge the validity of the pleas
on appeal, contending that his trial counsel
was ineffective in advising him. The claim
is, in substance, that his pleas were not
knowing and voluntary when entered.

March 25, 2004.

Failure to file a timely motion to withdraw
a guilty plea "extinguishes a defendant's
right to challenge the validity of the guilty
plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT
13,t 3, 40 P.3d 630, including any right to
challenge the guilty plea on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel. See State
v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,ffi[ 7-8, 40
P.3d 646. Because King failed to file a
timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas,
this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
claim that his guilty plea was not voluntary
as a result of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. King also failed to respond to the
State's motion for partial dismissal.
Finally, the rule 23 B motion seeks a
remand to enter findings of fact only on a
claim that counsel was ineffective in
representing King in connection with his
guilty pleas.™1 Accordingly, because we
dismiss appeal to the extent that it
challenges the validity of the guilty pleas,
we must also deny the rule 23 B motion.

Fifth District, Cedar City Department; The
Honorable J. Philip Eves.
Randall C. Allen, Cedar City, for
Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BILLINGS, JACKSON, and
THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Mario D. King appeals his conviction
and sentence for Forgery, a third degree
felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a
Credit Card, a class A misdemeanor. This
appeal is before the court on King's motion
for a remand pursuant to rule 23B of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and on
the State's motion for partial dismissal of

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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FN1. Even if the merits of the
motion were considered, it does not
satisfy rule 23B's requirement to
allege a nonspeculative allegation
of facts and instead makes
conclusory allegations that King
seeks to support on remand. See
Utah R.App. P. 23B(a); State v.
Johnson, 2000 UT App 2905f 7,
13 P.3d 175.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction only insofar as it raises issues
challenging the validity of the guilty plea.
The appeal shall continue as to the
remaining issues related to sentencing.
UtahApp.,2004.
State v. King
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 584587
(Utah App.), 2004 UT App 79
END OF DOCUMENT
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Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and
ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 This case is before the court on
Appellant Sione Latu's motion for remand
pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the State's cross
motion for summary dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction pursuant to rule 10 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Latu pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery,
reduced to a second degree felony. He was
sentenced that same day. Latu then filed a
notice of appeal. He did not, however, file
a motion to withdraw his plea. The basis of
Latu's motion to remand is that counsel for
his plea did not inform Latu of the
possibility of lesser offenses, including
theft and assault. Also, Latu claims that
counsel told him that he had no choice but
to plead guilty because he would certainly
be convicted of at least the second degree
felony at trial. Latu submitted an affidavit
in support of his claims. In his affidavit,
Latu claims that he would not have pleaded
guilty had he been aware of the lesser
offenses.
The State objected to remand and filed a
cross motion for summary dismissal on the
basis that this court lacks jurisdiction over
the appeal because Latu failed to file a
motion to withdraw his plea. See State v.
Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1 5, 40 P.3d 630. The
State claims that Latu's only remedy at this
point is a post-conviction petition under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c) (2003);
UtahR.CivP.65C.
Latu claims that denial of a direct appeal
from the plea would result in violations of
his constitutional rights. First, Latu
contends that dismissal of his appeal
would violate his right to due process.
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Since the 2003 revision to Utah Code
section 77-13-6, a motion to withdraw a
plea must be made and ruled upon prior to
imposition of sentence. The result,
according to Latu, is to deprive defendants
who plead and are sentenced on the same
day of their direct appeal.

request. Therefore, any distinction
created by a defendant's own actions.

The State responds that defendants who
plead and are sentenced at the same time
are not deprived of due process because
they have a remedy in the form of a
post-conviction petition. The State also
contends that defendants who plead, give
up many of their rights and significantly
limits their right to appeal. Defendants are
informed of this at the time the plea is
taken.
Latu claims that a post-conviction petition
is inadequate because, in a petition, the
appellant has the burden of persuasion.
The State correctly counters that, in both a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea and in a
direct appeal, the appellant also has the
burden of persuasion.
Second, Latu claims an equal protection
violation. Specifically, the defendants who
plead and are sentenced the same day are
treated differently from those who plead
and wait to be sentenced. The distinction,
according to Latu, is not justified. The
State argues that all defendants are
required to move to withdraw their plea
under Utah Code section 77-13-6,
therefore, all are treated the same.
Moreover, defendants who plead and are
sentenced the same day do so at their own
© 2006 Thomson/West. No CI

is

*2 Third, Latu alleges a separation of
powers violation. Latu, however, wholly
fails to argue or provide this court with any
analysis for this claim.
Because Latu failed to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, this court lacks
jurisdiction over the appeal. Once this
court has determined that it lacks
jurisdiction, it "retains only the authority to
dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac v.
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). As a result, this court also
lacks jurisdiction to remand the matter
pursuant to rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Accordingly, the motion for remand
pursuant to rule 23B of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure is denied and the
appeal is dismissed.
Utah App.,2004.
State v. Latu
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2692832
(Utah App.), 2004 UT App 437
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based on lack of jurisdiction.
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
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Connie Sue LEBOW, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20050611-CA.

Although Lebow pleaded guilty and seeks
to attack that plea on appeal, albeit on a
theory of ineffective assistance of counsel,
she did not file a motion to withdraw her
plea in the district court. Her failure to
timely file a motion to withdraw her plea
bars this court from considering her
challenge to the validity of her plea on
appeal.

Feb. 2, 2006.

Seventh District, Monticello Department,
051700037; The Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson.
William L. Schultz, Moab, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges GREENWOOD, MCHUGH
, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Connie Sue Lebow appeals her
conviction on a drug charge after pleading
guilty. This is before the court on Lebow's
motion for a remand pursuant to Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure 23B and on the
State's motion for summary disposition
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

Pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6, a
request to withdraw a guilty plea must be
made by a motion filed prior to sentencing.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003)
. The failure to timely file a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea "extinguishes a
defendant's right to challenge the validity
of the guilty plea on appeal." State v. Reyes,
2002 UT 13,1 3, 40 P.3d 630; see also,
State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585
(holding the time limit in section 77-13-6
is jurisdictional). Absent a timely motion
to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack
jurisdiction to consider any issue attacking
the guilty plea itself, including whether a
defendant received ineffective assistance
of counsel in the plea agreement. See
Merrill 2005 UT 34 at fflf 17-19; State
v.. Melo, 2001 UT App 392, ffif 6-8, 40
P.3d 646. Because Lebow failed to timely
move to withdraw her guilty plea, this
court lacks jurisdiction to consider her
claim that she received
ineffective
L to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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assistance of counsel in connection with
her plea. Lebow has not raised any other
issue that this court may review.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on
the dismissal, Lebow's motion for remand
is denied as moot.
Utah App.,2006.
State v. Lebow
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 246562
(Utah App.), 2006 UT App 27
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Third District, Salt Lake Department,
051902589. The Honorable Judith S.
Atherton.
Patrick S.
Appellant.
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Salt Lake

City,

for

Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD,
and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 Stephen Alfred Mallen appeals his
conviction after entering a guilty plea. On
appeal, he asserts his plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily made and seeks
to withdraw the plea. The appeal is before
the court on its own motion for summary
disposition due to the lack of a substantial
question for review.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No

).), 2005 UT App 443

Because Mallen did not make a timely
motion to withdraw his plea below, he is
precluded from challenging his plea on
appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6
(2003); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3,
40 P.3d 630. Section 77-13-6 provides that
a defendant may move to withdraw a guilty
plea only up to the time of sentencing. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b). The
failure to timely move to withdraw a plea
pursuant to section 77-13-6 "extinguishes a
defendant's right to challenge the validity
of the guilty plea on appeal." Reyes, 2002
UT 13 at 1f3.
This court lacks jurisdiction to address plea
issues on appeal absent a timely motion to
withdraw the plea. See id. As a result, this
court cannot address Mallen's challenge to
his guilty plea. Further, he raises no other
issue for review. With no substantial issue
for review, Mallen's conviction is
summarily affirmed.
UtahApp.,2005.
State v. Mallen
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 2600640
(Utah App.), 2005 UT App 443
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Defendant David Sousa appeals from a
district court order denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. The case is before
the court on its own motion for summary
affirmance. See Utah R.App. P. 10(e). We
affirm.
Defendant claims that the district court
erred by denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, which was based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. However,
Defendant failed to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea "within 30 days
after the entry of the plea." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999). That failure "
extinguished]
[Defendant's] right to
challenge the validity of the guilty plea on
appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,1 3,
40 P.3d 630, including his right to
challenge the validity of the plea on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,ffi[
7-8, 40 P.3d 646. Therefore, the district
court correctly concluded that it did not
have jurisdiction to consider Defendant's
ineffective assistance claim and correctly
denied his motion to withdraw his plea.
For the first time on appeal, Defendant
claims that his counsel was ineffective
because his counsel did not timely move to
withdraw the plea. However, section
77-13-6 does not permit this court, in this
direct appeal, to extend the thirty-day
period for filing a motion to withdraw a
plea or, although that period has run, to set
aside Defendant's plea because of post-plea
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.;
Melo, 2001 UT App 392 at ^ 7-8.
Defendant contends that not considering
this ineffective assistance claim violates
his right to seek redress from the courts.
See Utah Const, art. I, § 11. That argument
is unavailing given the availability of
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redress by petition for
relief.

post-conviction

In response to this court's motion for
summary affirmance, Defendant claims
that section 77-13-6 is unconstitutional as
applied to him because he did not discover
that he might be deported based on his plea
until after the thirty-day period for filing a
motion to withdraw his plea expired.
However,
although
Defendant
acknowledged that his motion to withdraw
his plea was not timely, he did not raise the
constitutionality of section 77-13-6 before
the district court. This court will not
consider issues, including constitutional
issues, raised for the first time on appeal.
See, e.g., State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d
920, 922 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
Accordingly, we affirm.
UtahApp.,2003.
State v. Sousa
Not Reported in P.3d, 2003 WL 22208919
(Utah App.), 2003 UT App 320
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